Windows.Sigma.Base Model #
This model is designed for triage of dead disk, or file based live analysis. The rules that use this model will be evaluated once on all events.
After all relevant rules are evaluated, the collection is complete.
Log Sources #
Following is a list of recognized log sources.
Field Mappings #
The following field mappings can be used to access fields within the
event. Note that it is also possible to access the fields directly
(e.g. EventData.AccessMask
)
Name | Mapping |
---|---|
x=>serialize(item=x.EventData) | |
AccessList | x=>x.EventData.AccessList |
AccessMask | x=>x.EventData.AccessMask |
Accesses | x=>x.EventData.Accesses |
AccountDomain | x=>x.EventData.AccountDomain |
AccountName | x=>x.EventData.AccountName |
Account_Name | x=>x.EventData.Account_Name |
Action | x=>x.EventData.Action |
Address | x=>x.EventData.Address |
AllowedToDelegateTo | x=>x.EventData.AllowedToDelegateTo |
AppName | x=>x.EventData.Data[0] |
ApplicationPath | x=>x.EventData.ApplicationPath |
AttributeLDAPDisplayName | x=>x.EventData.AttributeLDAPDisplayName |
AttributeValue | x=>x.EventData.AttributeValue |
AuditPolicyChanges | x=>x.EventData.AuditPolicyChanges |
AuditSourceName | x=>x.EventData.AuditSourceName |
AuthenticationPackageName | x=>x.EventData.AuthenticationPackageName |
CallTrace | x=>x.EventData.CallTrace |
CallerProcessName | x=>x.EventData.CallerProcessName |
Caller_Process_Name | x=>x.EventData.Caller_Process_Name |
CallingProcessName | x=>x.EventData.CallingProcessName |
Caption | x=>x.EventData.Caption |
CategoryName | x=>x.EventData.`Category Name` |
CertThumbprint | x=>x.EventData.CertThumbprint |
Channel | x=>x.System.Channel |
ClassName | x=>x.EventData.ClassName |
ClientAddress | x=>x.EventData.ClientAddress |
ClientName | x=>x.EventData.ClientName |
Client_Address | x=>x.EventData.Client_Address |
CommandLine | x=>x.EventData.CommandLine || x.CommandLine |
Company | x=>x.EventData.Company |
Computer | x=>x.System.Computer |
ComputerName | x=>x.System.Computer |
Contents | x=>x.EventData.Contents |
ContextInfo | x=>x.EventData.ContextInfo |
CreationUtcTime | x=>x.EventData.CreationUtcTime |
CurrentDirectory | x=>x.EventData.CurrentDirectory |
Data | x=>serialize(item=x.EventData) |
Description | x=>x.EventData.Description |
DestAddress | x=>x.EventData.DestAddress |
DestPort | x=>x.EventData.DestPort |
Destination | x=>x.EventData.Destination |
DestinationAddress | x=>x.EventData.DestinationAddress |
DestinationHostname | x=>x.EventData.DestinationHostname |
DestinationIp | x=>x.EventData.DestinationIp |
DestinationIsIpv6 | x=>x.EventData.DestinationIsIpv6 |
DestinationPort | x=>x.EventData.DestinationPort |
Details | x=>x.EventData.Details |
DetectionSource | x=>x.EventData.DetectionSource |
DetectionUser | x=>x.EventData.`Detection User` |
Device | x=>x.EventData.Device |
DeviceClassName | x=>x.EventData.DeviceClassName |
DeviceDescription | x=>x.EventData.DeviceDescription |
DeviceInstanceID | x=>x.UserData.InstallDeviceID.DeviceInstanceID |
DeviceName | x=>x.EventData.DeviceName |
DomainName | x=>x.EventData.SubjectDomainName |
DriverDescription | x=>x.UserData.InstallDeviceID.DriverDescription |
DriverProvider | x=>x.UserData.InstallDeviceID.DriverProvider |
DvrFmwk2003InstanceId | x=>x.UserData.UMDFHostDeviceArrivalBegin.InstanceId |
DvrFmwkInstanceId | x=>x.UserData.UMDFHostDeviceRequest.InstanceId |
EngineVersion | x=>x.EventData.EngineVersion |
ErrorCode | x=>x.EventData.ErrorCode |
EventData | x=>x.EventData |
EventID | x=>x.System.EventID.Value |
EventType | x=>x.EventData.EventType |
ExecutionProcessID | x=>x.System.Execution.ProcessID |
FailureCode | x=>x.EventData.FailureCode |
Feature_Name | x=>x.EventData.`Feature Name` |
FilePath | x=>x.EventData.FilePath |
FileVersion | x=>x.EventData.FileVersion |
Filename | x=>x.EventData.Filename |
GrandParentCommandLine | x=>x.EventData.GrandParentCommandLine |
GrandParentImage | x=>x.EventData.GrandParentImage |
GrantedAccess | x=>x.EventData.GrantedAccess |
GroupName | x=>x.EventData.GroupName |
GroupSid | x=>x.EventData.GroupSid |
Hash | x=>x.EventData.Hash |
Hashes | x=>x.EventData.Hashes |
HiveName | x=>x.EventData.HiveName |
HostApplication | x=>x.EventData.HostApplication |
HostName | x=>x.EventData.HostName |
HostVersion | x=>x.EventData.HostVersion |
Image | x=>x.EventData.Image |
ImageLoaded | x=>x.EventData.ImageLoaded |
ImagePath | x=>x.EventData.ImagePath |
Imphash | x=>x.EventData.Hashes |
Initiated | x=>x.EventData.Initiated |
InstallStatus | x=>x.UserData.InstallDeviceID.InstallStatus |
InstanceID | x=>x.UserData.UMDFHostDeviceArrivalBegin.InstanceId |
IntegrityLevel | x=>x.EventData.IntegrityLevel |
IpAddress | x=>x.EventData.IpAddress |
IpPort | x=>x.EventData.IpPort |
JobTitle | x=>x.EventData.name |
KeyLength | x=>x.EventData.KeyLength |
Keywords | x=>x.System.Keywords |
LDAPDisplayName | x=>x.EventData.LDAPDisplayName |
LayerRTID | x=>x.EventData.LayerRTID |
Level | x=>x.System.Level |
LocalIP | x=>x.EventData.LocalIP |
LocalPort | x=>x.EventData.LocalPort |
LogFileClearedChannel | x=>x.UserData.LogFileCleared.Channel |
LogFileClearedSubjectUserName | x=>x.UserData.LogFileCleared.SubjectUserName |
LogonID | x=>x.EventData.LogonID |
LogonId | x=>x.EventData.LogonId |
LogonProcessName | x=>x.EventData.LogonProcessName |
LogonType | x=>x.EventData.LogonType |
Logon_Account | x=>x.EventData.Logon_Account |
Logon_Type | x=>x.EventData.LogonType |
MD5 | x=>x.EventData.MD5 |
MachineName | x=>x.EventData.MachineName |
MandatoryLabel | x=>get(item=MandatoryLabelLookup, member=x.EventData.MandatoryLabel || "-") |
MemberName | x=>x.EventData.MemberName |
MemberSid | x=>x.EventData.MemberSid |
Message | x=>x.EventData |
ModifyingApplication | x=>x.EventData.ModifyingApplication |
ModuleMD5 | x=>x.EventData.ModuleMD5 |
ModuleName | x=>x.EventData.ModuleName |
ModulePath | x=>x.EventData.ModulePath |
ModuleSHA1 | x=>x.EventData.ModuleSHA1 |
ModuleSHA256 | x=>x.EventData.ModuleSHA256 |
NewName | x=>x.EventData.NewName |
NewProcessId | x=>x.EventData.NewProcessId |
NewProcessName | x=>x.EventData.NewProcessName |
NewTemplateContent | x=> x.EventData.NewTemplateContent |
NewUacValue | x=>x.EventData.NewUacValue |
NewValue | x=>x.EventData.NewValue |
New_Value | x=>x.EventData.`New Value` |
ObjectClass | x=>x.EventData.ObjectClass |
ObjectName | x=>x.EventData.ObjectName |
ObjectServer | x=>x.EventData.ObjectServer |
ObjectType | x=>x.EventData.ObjectType |
ObjectValueName | x=>x.EventData.ObjectValueName |
OldUacValue | x=>x.EventData.OldUacValue |
OperationEssStartedNamespaceName | x=>x.UserData.Operation_EssStarted.NamespaceName |
OperationEssStartedPossibleCause | x=>x.UserData.Operation_EssStarted.PossibleCause |
OperationEssStartedProcessid | x=>x.UserData.Operation_EssStarted.Processid |
OperationEssStartedProvider | x=>x.UserData.Operation_EssStarted.Provider |
OperationEssStartedQuery | x=>x.UserData.Operation_EssStarted.Query |
OperationEssStartedUser | x=>x.UserData.Operation_EssStarted.User |
Origin | x=>x.EventData.Origin |
OriginalFileName | x=>x.EventData.OriginalFileName |
OriginalFilename | x=>x.EventData.OriginalFileName |
PID | x=>x.EventData.ProcessId |
PackageFullName | x=>x.UserData.PackageFullName |
ParentCommandLine | x=>x.EventData.ParentCommandLine |
ParentImage | x=>x.EventData.ParentImage |
ParentMD5 | x=>x.EventData.ParentMD5 |
ParentProcessId | x=>x.EventData.ParentProcessId |
ParentProcessName | x=>x.EventData.ParentProcessName |
ParentSHA1 | x=>x.EventData.ParentSHA1 |
ParentSHA256 | x=>x.EventData.ParentSHA256 |
ParentUser | x=>x.EventData.ParentUser |
PasswordLastSet | x=>x.EventData.PasswordLastSet |
Path | x=>x.EventData.Path |
Payload | x=>x.EventData.Payload |
PipeName | x=>x.EventData.PipeName |
PossibleCause | x=>x.UserData.PossibleCause |
PreAuthType | x=>x.EventData.PreAuthType |
PreviousCreationUtcTime | x=>x.EventData.PreviousCreationUtcTime |
PrivilegeList | x=>x.EventData.PrivilegeList |
ProcessCommandLine | x=>x.EventData.ProcessCommandLine |
ProcessGuid | x=>x.EventData.ProcessGuid |
ProcessId | x=>x.EventData.ProcessId |
ProcessName | x=>x.EventData.ProcessName |
Product | x=>x.EventData.Product |
Properties | x=>x.EventData.Properties |
Protocol | x=>x.EventData.Protocol |
Provider | x=>x.UserData.Provider |
ProviderName | x=>x.System.Provider.Name |
Provider_Name | x=>x.System.Provider.Name |
QNAME | x=>x.EventData.QNAME |
Query | x=>x.UserData.Query |
QueryName | x=>x.EventData.QueryName |
QueryResults | x=>x.EventData.QueryResults |
QueryStatus | x=>x.EventData.QueryStatus |
RelativeTargetName | x=>x.EventData.RelativeTargetName |
RemoteIP | x=>x.EventData.RemoteIP |
RemoteName | x=>x.EventData.RemoteName |
RemotePort | x=>x.EventData.RemotePort |
RuleName | x=>x.EventData.RuleName |
SAMAccountName | x=>x.EventData.SamAccountName |
SHA1 | x=>x.EventData.SHA1 |
SHA256 | x=>x.EventData.SHA256 |
SamAccountName | x=>x.EventData.SamAccountName |
ScriptBlockText | x=>x.EventData.ScriptBlockText |
SearchFilter | x=>x.System.SearchFilter |
SecurityUserID | x=>x.System.Security.UserID |
ServerName | x=>x.System.ServerName |
Service | x=>x.EventData.Service |
ServiceFileName | x=>x.EventData.ServiceFileName |
ServiceName | x=>x.EventData.ServiceName |
ServicePrincipalNames | x=>x.EventData.ServicePrincipalNames |
ServiceStartType | x=>x.EventData.ServiceStartType |
ServiceType | x=>x.EventData.ServiceType |
SeverityID | x=>x.EventData.`Severity ID` |
SeverityName | x=>x.EventData.`Severity Name` |
ShareLocalPath | x=>x.EventData.ShareLocalPath |
ShareName | x=>x.EventData.ShareName |
SidHistory | x=>x.EventData.SidHistory |
Signature | x=>x.EventData.Signature |
SignatureStatus | x=>x.EventData.SignatureStatus |
Signed | x=>x.EventData.Signed |
Source | x=>x.System.Provider_Name |
SourceAddress | x=>x.EventData.SourceAddress |
SourceHostname | x=>x.EventData.SourceHostname |
SourceImage | x=>x.EventData.SourceImage |
SourceIp | x=>x.EventData.SourceIp |
SourceIsIpv6 | x=>x.EventData.SourceIsIpv6 |
SourceNetworkAddress | x=>x.EventData.SourceNetworkAddress |
SourcePort | x=>x.EventData.SourcePort |
Source_Name | x=>x.EventData.`Source Name` |
Source_Network_Address | x=>x.EventData.Source_Network_Address |
Source_WorkStation | x=>x.EventData.Source_WorkStation |
StartAddress | x=>x.EventData.StartAddress |
StartFunction | x=>x.EventData.StartFunction |
StartModule | x=>x.EventData.StartModule |
StartType | x=>x.EventData.StartType |
State | x=>x.EventData.State |
Status | x=>x.EventData.Status |
SubStatus | x=>x.EventData.SubStatus |
SubjectDomainName | x=>x.EventData.SubjectDomainName |
SubjectLogonId | x=>x.EventData.SubjectLogonId |
SubjectUserName | x=>x.EventData.SubjectUserName |
SubjectUserSid | x=>x.EventData.SubjectUserSid |
SysmonVersion | x=>x.EventData.SysmonVersion |
TargetDomainName | x=>x.EventData.TargetDomainName |
TargetFilename | x=>x.EventData.TargetFilename |
TargetImage | x=>x.EventData.TargetImage |
TargetInfo | x=>x.EventData.TargetInfo |
TargetLogonId | x=>x.EventData.TargetLogonId |
TargetObject | x=>x.EventData.TargetObject |
TargetOutboundUserName | x=>x.EventData.TargetOutboundUserName |
TargetProcessAddress | x=>x.EventData.TargetProcessAddress |
TargetServerName | x=>x.EventData.TargetServerName |
TargetSid | x=>x.EventData.TargetSid |
TargetUserName | x=>x.EventData.TargetUserName |
TaskDate | x=>x.EventData.TaskContent |
TaskName | x=>x.EventData.TaskName |
TemplateContent | x=>x.EventData.TemplateContent |
ThreatName | x=>x.EventData.`Threat Name` |
TicketEncryptionType | x=>x.EventData.TicketEncryptionType |
TicketOptions | x=>x.EventData.TicketOptions |
Timestamp | x=>x.Timestamp |
TokenElevationType | x=>get(item=TokenElevationTypeLookup, member=x.EventData.TokenElevationType || "-") |
Type | x=>x.EventData.Type |
Url | x=>x.EventData.url |
User | x=>x.EventData.User |
UserDataAddress | x=>x.UserData.EventXML.Address |
UserDataCode | x=>x.UserData.Operation_StartedOperational.Code |
UserDataConsumer | x=>x.UserData.Operation_ESStoConsumerBinding.CONSUMER |
UserDataESS | x=>x.UserData.Operation_ESStoConsumerBinding.ESS |
UserDataHostProcess | x=>x.UserData.Operation_StartedOperational.HostProcess |
UserDataNamespace | x=>x.UserData.Operation_ESStoConsumerBinding.Namespace |
UserDataNamespaceName | x=>x.UserData.Operation_TemporaryEssStarted.NamespaceName |
UserDataParam1 | x=>x.UserData.EventXML.Param1 |
UserDataParam2 | x=>x.UserData.EventXML.Param2 |
UserDataParam3 | x=>x.UserData.EventXML.Param3 |
UserDataPossibleCause | x=>x.UserData.Operation_ESStoConsumerBinding.PossibleCause |
UserDataProcessID | x=>x.UserData.Operation_StartedOperational.ProcessID |
UserDataProcessid | x=>x.UserData.Operation_TemporaryEssStarted.Processid |
UserDataProviderName | x=>x.UserData.Operation_StartedOperational.ProviderName |
UserDataProviderPath | x=>x.UserData.Operation_StartedOperational.ProviderPath |
UserDataQuery | x=>x.UserData.Operation_TemporaryEssStarted.Query |
UserDataSessionID | x=>x.UserData.EventXML.SessionID |
UserDataUser | x=>x.UserData.EventXML.User |
UserName | x=>x.EventData.UserName |
Value | x=>x.EventData.Value |
Version | x=>x.System.Version |
VhdType | x=>x.EventData.VhdType |
WindowsDefenderProcessName | x=>x.EventData.`Process Name` |
Workstation | x=>x.EventData.Workstation |
WorkstationName | x=>x.EventData.WorkstationName |
image | x=>x.EventData.Image |
md5 | x=>parse_string_with_regex(string=x.EventData.Hash || '', regex='MD5=([^,]+)').g1 |
param1 | x=>x.EventData.param1 |
param2 | x=>x.EventData.param2 |
param3 | x=>x.EventData.param3 |
param4 | x=>x.EventData.param4 |
param5 | x=>x.EventData.param5 |
processPath | x=>x.EventData.processPath |
query | x=>x.EventData.Query |
service | x=>x.EventData.Service |
sha1 | x=>x.EventData.Hashes |
sha256 | x=>parse_string_with_regex(string=x.EventData.Hash || '', regex='SHA256=([^,]+)').g1 |
*/windows/application
#
This Log Source generates events from the Application Channel.
These are usually stored in the file C:\Windows\System32\WinEvt\Logs\Application.evtx
The channel stores a wide variety of system events from multiple services.
*/windows/applocker
#
This Log Source generates combined events from the Windows AppLocker service
.
Events are usually stored in the files:
C:\Windows\System32\WinEvt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker%4MSI and Script.evtx
C:\Windows\System32\WinEvt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker%4EXE and DLL.evtx
C:\Windows\System32\WinEvt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker%4Packaged app-Deployment.evtx
C:\Windows\System32\WinEvt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker%4Packaged app-Execution.evtx
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=[
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker%4MSI and Script.evtx",
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker%4EXE and DLL.evtx",
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker%4Packaged app-Deployment.evtx",
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker%4Packaged app-Execution.evtx",
])
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: applocker
*/windows/appmodel-runtime
#
This Log Source generates combined events from the Windows AppModel Runtime
.
Events are usually stored in the files:
C:\Windows\System32\WinEvt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-AppModel-Runtime%4Admin.evtx
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-AppModel-Runtime%4Admin.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: appmodel-runtime
*/windows/appxdeployment-server
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-AppxPackaging%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: appxdeployment-server
*/windows/appxpackaging-om
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-AppxPackaging%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: appxpackaging-om
*/windows/bits-client
#
This Log Source generates combined events from the Windows Bits Client service.
Events are usually stored in the files:
C:\Windows\System32\WinEvt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client%4Operational.evtx
The BITS service is used to download files and it is often misused by threat actors to download malicious payloads.
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample Events #
EventID 3 - New Job Creation #
{"Timestamp":"2025-01-13T13:48:20.745705604Z","System":{"Provider":{"Name":"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client","Guid":"EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E"},"EventID":{"Value":3},"Version":3,"Level":4,"Task":0,"Opcode":0,"Keywords":4611686018427387904,"TimeCreated":{"SystemTime":1736776100.7457056},"EventRecordID":1320,"Correlation":{},"Execution":{"ProcessID":8936,"ThreadID":9100},"Channel":"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational","Computer":"WIN-SJE0CKQO83P","Security":{"UserID":"S-1-5-18"}},"EventData":{"jobTitle":"Chrome Component Updater","jobId":"B73C90F1-5FA7-4445-8E49-6C40870E4502","jobOwner":"WIN-SJE0CKQO83P\\Administrator","processPath":"C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe","processId":3616,"ClientProcessStartKey":1407374883553491},"Message":"The BITS service created a new job.\nTransfer job: Chrome Component Updater\nJob ID: B73C90F1-5FA7-4445-8E49-6C40870E4502\nOwner: WIN-SJE0CKQO83P\\Administrator\nProcess Path: C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe\nProcess ID: 3616\r\n"}
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: bits-client
*/windows/capi2
#
*/windows/certificateservicesclient-lifecycle-system
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-CertificateServicesClient-Lifecycle-System/Operational")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: certificateservicesclient-lifecycle-system
*/windows/codeintegrity-operational
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: codeintegrity-operational
*/windows/diagnosis-scripted
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Diagnosis-Scripted%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: diagnosis-scripted
*/windows/dns-client
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client Events%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: dns-client
*/windows/dns-server
#
*/windows/dns-server-analytic
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server%4Analytical.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: dns-server-analytic
*/windows/driver-framework
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-DriverFrameworks-UserMode%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: driver-framework
*/windows/firewall-as
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security%4Firewall.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: firewall-as
*/windows/ldap_debug
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-LDAP-Client%4Debug.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: ldap_debug
*/windows/lsa-server
#
*/windows/microsoft-servicebus-client
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-ServiceBus-Client.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: microsoft-servicebus-client
*/windows/msexchange-management
#
*/windows/ntlm
#
*/windows/openssh
#
*/windows/powershell
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=[
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx",
ROOT + "/PowerShellCore%4Operational.evtx",
])
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: powershell
*/windows/powershell-classic
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *, EventData + dict(
Data=EventData.Data[2],
HostApplication=parse_string_with_regex(
regex="HostApplication=([^\\r\\n]+)",
string=EventData.Data[2]).g1) AS EventData
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Windows PowerShell.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: powershell-classic
*/windows/security
#
*/windows/security-mitigations
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: security-mitigations
*/windows/shell-core
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: shell-core
*/windows/smbclient-security
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-SmbClient%4Security.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: smbclient-security
*/windows/sysmon
#
*/windows/system
#
*/windows/taskscheduler
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: taskscheduler
*/windows/terminalservices-localsessionmanager
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: terminalservices-localsessionmanager
*/windows/vhdmp
#
*/windows/windefend
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: windefend
*/windows/wmi
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
product: windows
service: wmi
process_creation/windows/*
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=[
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon%4Operational.evtx",
ROOT + "/Security.evtx"
])
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
AND System.EventID.Value = 1 OR System.EventID.Value = 4688
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
ps_classic_provider_start/windows/*
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Windows PowerShell.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime AND System.EventID.Value = 600
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
category: ps_classic_provider_start
product: windows
ps_classic_start/windows/*
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Windows PowerShell.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime AND System.EventID.Value = 400
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
category: ps_classic_start
product: windows
ps_module/windows/*
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=[
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx",
ROOT + "/PowerShellCore%4Operational.evtx"
])
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime AND System.EventID.Value = 4103
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
category: ps_module
product: windows
ps_script/windows/*
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=[
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx",
ROOT + "/PowerShellCore%4Operational.evtx"
])
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime AND System.EventID.Value = 4104
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
category: ps_script
product: windows
registry_add/windows/*
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=[
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon%4Operational.evtx",
ROOT + "/Security.evtx"
])
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime AND System.EventID.Value = 12 OR System.EventID.Value = 4657
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
category: registry_add
product: windows
registry_event/windows/*
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=[
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon%4Operational.evtx",
ROOT + "/Security.evtx"
])
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
AND System.EventID.Value IN (12, 13, 14) OR System.EventID.Value = 4657
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
registry_set/windows/*
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=[
ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon%4Operational.evtx",
ROOT + "/Security.evtx"
])
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
AND System.EventID.Value = 13 OR System.EventID.Value = 4657
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
antivirus/windows/windefend
#
VQL Query #
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS Timestamp, *
FROM parse_evtx(filename=ROOT + "/Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE Timestamp >= DateAfterTime AND Timestamp <= DateBeforeTime
Sample use in a sigma rule: #
logsource:
category: antivirus
product: windows
service: windefend